Legitimation of the state means. The concept of "legitimacy": what does it mean? How is legitimacy reflected in one’s position in society?

The term "legalization" comes from the Latin word "legalis", which means legal. References to legalization as the basis of power and proper behavior already in the 4th-3rd centuries. BC. were used by the school of Chinese legalists in a dispute with the Confucians, who demanded behavior that would be consistent with universal harmony. Elements of a kind of legalization were present in the confrontation between secular and spiritual authorities in Western Europe in the Middle Ages; in modern times, supporters of the “legitimate monarchy” of the Bourbons referred to it when speaking against the “usurper” Napoleon Theory of State and Law: A Course of Lectures / Ed. N.I. Matuzova and A.V. Malko. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional M.: Lawyer. 2001. P.451.

In modern conditions of legalization of state power as a legal concept means the establishment, recognition, support of this power by law, primarily by the constitution, the support of power on the law. However, firstly, constitutions and laws can be adopted, amended, or repealed in various ways. The military and revolutionary councils created as a result of military coups in many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America decreed the abolition (often suspension) of constitutions and often proclaimed new temporary constitutions without any special procedures.

In fact, in Iraq such a temporary constitution has remained in force from 1970 to the present; in the UAE, a temporary constitution adopted by the emirs has been in force since 1971. In some countries, constitutions have been replaced by institutional acts (Brazil) and proclamations (Ethiopia). Monarchs single-handedly “granted” constitutions to “their faithful people” (Nepal, Saudi Arabia, etc.) Grafsky V.G. General history of law and state: Textbook for universities. - M.: Norma, 2005. P.532. In Russia, in 1993, the 1978 Constitution (as amended) was suspended by presidential decree. Secondly, sometimes constitutions and laws adopted in accordance with established procedures, in their content, legalized openly dictatorial, anti-people power, a totalitarian system. These were the constitutional acts of fascist Germany, the racist legislation of South Africa (before the adoption of a provisional constitution in 1994), the “party-state” of Guinea or the constitution of African Zaire (there were several of them), which proclaimed that there was only one political institution in the country - the ruling party - movement, and the legislative, executive bodies, and courts are the organs of this party. The constitutions of Russia and the USSR, adopted during the Soviet period and proclaiming that power belonged to the working people, in fact legalized a totalitarian and even at times terrorist regime.

Of course, in the conditions of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, constitutions can be adopted by apparently democratic means (by the Constituent Assembly, the Supreme Council in the USSR in 1977, a referendum in Cuba in 1976), they can contain democratic provisions, the rights of citizens (in the Constitution of the USSR 1936 . a wide range of socio-economic rights was established), etc. But these points need to be assessed only in conjunction with reality.

Thus, the elections of the parliament itself, which adopts the constitution, are not free under a totalitarian regime, and phrases about democracy serve as a cover for the real situation. Thus, if the democratic procedures for adopting a constitution or other acts of constitutional significance are violated, if such procedures do not correspond to the people’s ability to exercise constituent power when adopting the fundamental law, if the laws contradict the universal human values ​​of humanity, the formal (legal) law does not correspond to the law. Legal legalization of state power in such conditions will be illusory, i.e. false legalization.

The concept of legitimation of state power seems more complex. “Legitimus” also means legal, legalized, but this concept is not legal, but factual, although legal elements may be part of it. Essentially, this is what the Confucians proceeded from in their dispute with the mentioned legalists; supporters of both secular and spiritual authorities had this in mind, interpreting “the will of God” differently. The modern meaning of this concept is associated with the research of political scientists, primarily the German scientist Max Weber (1864-1920).

The currently existing interpretation of the concept of legitimacy of state power was formed under the influence of the theoretical constructions of M. Weber and, in particular, one of his fundamental theses: “... the state is that human society that, within a certain area (...) claims (with success) to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence.” Weber M. Politics as a calling and profession. // Selected works. M. 1990. P. 645. At the same time, authors of the second half of the 20th century, writing on the topic of political sociology, express two opposing views on the possibility of using the concept of legitimacy in characterizing societies of the distant past. Thus, the authors of Pengan’s “Sociological Dictionary” argue that “within the framework of classical civilizations there was no significant difference between “legitimacy” and “legitimacy”: legal power was legitimate.” Abercombe N., Stephen H., Brian S. T. Sociological Dictionary. Kazan 1997. P. 152. This means that until the formation of representative democracy, the problem of legitimating state power cannot be considered independent.

The opposite point of view involves the identification of special types of legitimacy and, accordingly, special forms of legitimation of power for different stages of the history of the state, starting from the most ancient times. M. Weber himself identified three stages of development of the legitimacy of power in pre-bourgeois society: gerontocratic, patriarchal and patrimonal. Weber M. Politics as a calling and profession. // Selected works. M. 1990. P. 646. Jurgen Habermas and sociologists of his circle specifically stipulated that in medieval states the legitimacy of royal power could not be based only on dynastic rules or title. It had to be constantly confirmed by the effective performance of “the functions of management and court.” American historian Nancy Kollmann, highlighting two stages of legitimation of state power in the history of Muscovite Rus': “charismatic” and “traditional” Fetisov A. S. Political power: problems of legitimacy. //Social and political magazine. 1995. N 3. P. 104.. In this last case, the “Weberian” division into “types” of legitimation of power is used: traditional, charismatic and rational, and the transfer of certain types to different time periods.

Of interest to the researcher is not only the type of legitimacy, but also those forms that are used to legitimize power at a particular stage of historical development. The entire set of features of legitimate power in a given society could be designated as a potestary image of power, in which two parts are clearly distinguished. The first part is the way to gain power. The moment of transfer of power from one hand to another extremely actualizes the concept of “legitimacy” and, thus, makes it possible to determine those historical and national forms that are characteristic of a given time and a given state. The characteristics of this part of the potestar image can be considered Theory of State and Law: A Course of Lectures / Ed. N.I. Matuzova and A.V. Malko. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional M.: Lawyer. 2001. P.457:

• · political and cultural stereotypes that have developed in a given society, to which the contender for power appeals;
• · ideological and political theories that substantiate the rights of a contender for power;
• · public and state institutions involved in the transfer of power;
• · rites and ceremonies used during the transition of power;
• · rituals and ceremonies through which the people’s consent to the transfer of power is expressed.

The second part of the potestar image reflects the ever-present need to legitimize the decisions that the authorities make in the process of public administration. Accordingly, it describes a method of legitimate action, recognized by the people not only as a legal action, but also as a correct action. For this part of the potestar image of power, V.E. Chirkin can be considered the most significant features. Legalization and legitimation of state power // State and Law. 1995. No. 8. P. 64:

• · appearance of the holders of power;
• · ceremonial behavior corresponding to the current idea of ​​the organization of power;
• · everyday behavior that corresponds to the ethical standards recognized in a given society;
• · method of making government decisions;
• · the method of formalizing the decisions made;
• · way of communicating decisions made to the population;
• · the possibility of adjusting decisions made, depending on the positive or negative perception of it by the population.

Legitimation often has nothing to do with the law at all, and sometimes even contradicts it. This is a process, not necessarily formal and even most often informal, through which state power acquires the property of legitimacy, i.e. a state that expresses the correctness, justification, expediency, legality and other aspects of the compliance of a specific state power with the attitudes and expectations of the individual, social and other groups, and society as a whole. Recognition of state power and its actions as legitimate is based on sensory perception, experience, and rational assessment. It is based not on external signs (although, for example, the oratorical abilities of leaders can have a significant impact on the public, contributing to the establishment of charismatic power), but on internal motivations, internal incentives. The legitimation of state power is not associated with the publication of a law, the adoption of a constitution (although this may also be part of the legitimation process), but with a complex of experiences and internal attitudes of people, with the ideas of various segments of the population about compliance with state power; by its bodies the norms of social justice, human rights, and their protection.

Illegitimate power is based on violence and other forms of coercion, including mental influence, but legitimation cannot be imposed on people from the outside, for example, by force of arms or the imposition of a “good” constitution by a monarch on his people. It is created by people’s devotion to a certain social system (sometimes to a certain person), which expresses the immutable values ​​of existence. The basis of this kind of devotion is the belief of people that their benefits depend on the preservation and support of a given order, a given state power, the belief that they express the interests of the people. Therefore, the legitimation of state power is always connected with the interests of people, various segments of the population.

And since the interests and needs of various groups, due to limited resources and other circumstances, can only be partially satisfied, or only the demands of some groups can be fully satisfied, the legitimation of state power in society, with rare exceptions, cannot have a comprehensive, universal character: what is legitimate for some, appears as illegitimate for others. The wholesale “expropriation of expropriators” is a phenomenon that does not have legality, because modern constitutions provide for the possibility of nationalizing only certain objects only on the basis of the law and with mandatory compensation, the amount of which in controversial cases is established by the court, and is extremely illegitimate not only from the point of view of the owners of the means of production , but also other segments of the population Chirkin V.E. Legalization and legitimation of state power // State and Law. 1995. No. 8. P. 67.

In the minds of the lumpen proletariat, general expropriation has the highest degree of legitimacy. One can cite many other examples of the different interests of certain segments of the population and their unequal, often opposite, attitudes towards the measures of state power and towards the government itself. Therefore, its legitimation is not associated with the approval of the entire society (this is an extremely rare option), but with its acceptance by the majority of the population while respecting and protecting the rights of the minority. It is this, and not the dictatorship of a class, that makes state power legitimate - the legitimation of state power gives it the necessary authority in society. The majority of the population voluntarily and consciously submits to it, the legal demands of its bodies and representatives, which gives it stability, stability, and the necessary degree of freedom in the implementation of state policy. The higher the level of legitimation of state power, the wider the opportunities for leading society with minimal “power” costs and expenditures of “managerial energy”, with greater freedom for self-regulation of social processes. At the same time, the legitimate government has the right and obligation, in the interests of society, to apply coercive measures provided for by law if other methods of stopping antisocial actions do not produce results.

But an arithmetic majority cannot always serve as the basis for genuine legitimation of state power. The majority of Germans under Hitler's regime adopted a policy of "race cleansing" and territorial claims, which ultimately led to great misfortune for the German people. Consequently, not all assessments of the majority make state power truly legitimate. The decisive criterion is its compliance with universal human values.

The legitimation of state power is assessed not by the words of its representatives (although this is important), not by the texts of the programs and laws it has adopted (although this is important), but by its practical activities, by the way it resolves fundamental issues in the life of society and each individual. The population sees the difference between slogans about reforms and democracy, on the one hand, and authoritarian ways of making decisions that are most important for the fate of the country and the people, on the other.

From here, as evidenced by systematic surveys of the population, came the erosion of the legitimacy of state power in Russia at the end of the 20th century. (legitimacy was high after August 1991) while maintaining its legalization: all the highest bodies of the state were created according to the 1993 Constitution and act in principle in accordance with it, but according to polls organized at the end of March 1995 on the instructions of the NTV channel, 6% of respondents trusted the President of Russia, 78% did not trust him. Of course, survey data does not always give the correct picture, but these data should not be underestimated. Avrutin L.G. Legitimation of political power in Russia: analysis, problems, priorities. Diss... cand. polit, science - M., 2001. P. 45..

It has already been said above that the legitimation of state power can and, as a rule, includes its legalization. But legitimation is in conflict with formal legalization if legal laws do not correspond to the norms of justice, general democratic values, and attitudes prevailing among the majority of the country's population. In this case, legitimation is either absent (for example, the population has a negative attitude towards the totalitarian order established by the authorities), or in the course of revolutionary events, national liberation movements, a different, anti-state, rebel, pre-state power that has emerged in the liberated areas is legitimized, which then becomes state power . This is how events developed in China, Vietnam, Laos, Angola, and Mozambique. Guinea-Bissau and some other countries Grafsky V.G. General history of law and state: Textbook for universities. - M.: Norma, 2005. P.479.

Similar to the false legalization noted above, false legitimation is also possible when, under the influence of propaganda, inciting nationalist sentiments, the use of personal charisma and other techniques (including banning the opposition and free press, as a result of which the population does not have proper information), a significant part, or even the majority of the population supports state power that satisfies some of its current interests to the detriment of its fundamental aspirations.

The problems of verification of legalization and legitimation (including false) are very complex. They are not sufficiently developed in the scientific literature, including foreign ones. Legitimation is usually associated with a legal analysis of the preparation and adoption of the constitution, with the study of decisions of constitutional courts and other bodies of constitutional control, analysis of data from elections and referendums... Less attention is paid to the content of constitutional acts, the nature of the activities of state power, comparison of the programs of political parties and the policies which is carried out by those in power. Very rare is the scientific analysis of programs in comparison with the actions of various high officials

It is even more difficult to identify indicators of legitimation. In this case, the results of elections and referendums are also used, but in the first case, falsification is common, and the second does not always reflect the true sentiments of the people, since these results are determined by transitory factors. In many developing countries with a one-party system (Ghana, Burma, Algeria, etc.) in parliamentary and presidential elections, the ruling party received an overwhelming majority of votes, but the same population remained completely indifferent to the military coups that overthrew this government V. G. Grafsky. General History Law and State: Textbook for Universities. - M.: Norma, 2005. P.480. At the 1991 referendum on the question of preserving the USSR, the majority of voters gave an affirmative answer, but a few months later the USSR collapsed due to the indifference of a significant part of the same voters. Thus, formal assessments used in legalization require a deep and comprehensive analysis when determining the legitimacy of state power.

Legalization state power. Laws and other normative acts issued on behalf of government authorities legalize (from the Latin word “leх”), i.e. make legal or, on the contrary, illegal, illegal, certain relationships in society, allowing or prohibiting them. In turn, state power itself also needs legalization.

Legalization of state power is a legal declaration of the legality of its emergence (establishment), organization and activity. Under normal conditions, the legalization of state power is carried out primarily by constitutions, especially if they are adopted in a referendum, like the Russian Constitution of 1993, which legalized the state power that arose after the removal of the Communist Party from power, the actual dissolution of the two-member parliament (Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council ). Legalization can also be carried out through the adoption of a constitution by the people elected by the Constituent Assembly (for example, in Spain in 1978 after the liquidation of the totalitarian Franco regime) or by parliament (Constitution of Ukraine 1996). Constitutions establish the foundations of the social and state system, the procedure for creating and the system of state bodies, methods of exercising state power, making them legal and legitimate.

The legalization of state power, its bodies, their powers, and the procedure for their activities is also carried out by other legal acts: laws (for example, laws on elections of parliament and president, laws on the government, on the judicial system), presidential decrees, government decrees, court decisions (for example, the Constitutional Court and other courts considering disputes about powers between state bodies), etc.

In the conditions of various kinds of military and coups d'etat, revolutionary events, the new government, its emergency bodies, trying to create a legal basis for their activities, adopt temporary basic acts (“decrees of the October Revolution” in 1917-1918 in Russia, temporary constitutions proclaimed by President Nasser in Egypt in the 60s, the proclamations of the military council in Ethiopia, which for 13 years until 1987 replaced the constitution, etc.). Then the emergency (military, revolutionary, etc.) regime is gradually transformed into a regular, civil one, a constitution is adopted, and the leader of the previous regime, as a rule, organizes his election as president. This often happened in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Legalization of state power is a legal concept. The justification of power in this case is rooted in legal acts, although there are constitutional acts that legalize (in fact, only externally) anti-people, anti-democratic, terrorist state power. These were the legal acts of Hitler’s Germany, which proclaimed the undivided power of the “Führer”, the “institutional acts” of the Brazilian junta, adopted after the military coup of 1964, the laws of South Africa in the 50s - early 90s. XX century, which established the apartheid regime, which excluded people of color from the number of citizens of the country. Therefore, when determining the legality or illegality of state power, the extent of its legalization, it is necessary to take into account not only external signs (for example, the presence or absence of a constitution, other fundamental law defining the limits of state power, the fundamental rights of citizens), but also the extent to which legal acts that carry out legalization , comply with universal human values ​​and principles of law, including international law.

State power must be legitimate. Firstly, its very origin (establishment) must be legal. Usurpation, seizure of state power (As a rule, this is a violent act) is illegal, since state power must be entrusted to its organs in accordance with the procedures of the constitution. The Russian Constitution of 1993 establishes that “no one can appropriate power in the Russian Federation. Seizure of power or appropriation of power is prosecuted under federal law” (Part 4 of Article 3). Secondly, its organization must be closed. In a modern state, power cannot be exercised without the direct participation of the people, for example, through elections of the most important bodies, and if there is no elected parliament and president in the country for many years (the country is ruled by a person proclaimed president by the military council), there are no local representative bodies that act extraordinary courts, the organization of such power does not correspond to the true principles of legality. Thirdly, the sphere of authority of the authorities must be legitimate - the relations that it has the right and can regulate. Intervention by government authorities in the private lives of citizens, for example, at one time in African Zaire it was forbidden to give foreign names to children, in Malawi for men to wear long hair, in Burma (Myanmar) in 1995 for women to wear split skirts) contradicts the principles of personal freedom, natural human rights, which are the postulates of true legality. For example, there must be forms and methods of government activity. They must be carried out in accordance with legal norms based on the recognition of universal human values. Mass terror of the state authorities in relation to the population of the country, deportation of entire peoples (as was the case in the USSR under the Stalinist regime), deprivation of the majority of the population of voting rights (5/6 of the total population, as was the case in South Africa until the 90s), persecution of dissidents, etc. deprives state power of true legality.

Violation of the principle of legality of state power implies legal liability - political, criminal, civil. It can be expressed in the resignation of senior officials, the bringing to trial of persons who attempted a state or military coup (this happens, however, only in cases of unsuccessful attempts), the removal from office (with the possibility of then being brought to trial) of the president and other high-ranking officials for abuse of power, treason against the state, in compensation for damage to citizens in the event of illegal use of state power by its various bodies and officials.

Legitimation state power. The term “legitimation” is based on the same Latin word that is used for the concept of “legitimation”, but the first term is given a different interpretation. This is also legalization, but legalization is not only legal, mainly non-legal, often not related to law, and finally, sometimes contrary to legal norms. In contrast to the previous interpretation of the legitimacy of monarchical dynasties, in the modern understanding, legitimacy is not a legal, but an actual state, not necessarily formal, but more often informal. Legitimation of state power is the processes and phenomena through which it acquires the property of legitimacy, expressing correctness, justification, fairness, legal and moral legitimacy and other aspects of compliance of this power, its activities with certain, primarily mental attitudes, expectations (expectations) of society and people , of people. Legitimate state power is power that corresponds to the ideas of the society of a given country about proper state power. Such ideas are associated primarily not with legal norms, but with the material, social, political, spiritual conditions of public life, with the individual and social psyche of people and their groups.

Legitimation is based on people’s belief that their benefits (material and spiritual) depend on the preservation and maintenance of a given order in society, the belief that such an order expresses their interests. Legitimation is directly related to the interests of people, which are most often assessed by them consciously, but sometimes have an unconscious nature (for example, a certain support in society for the fascist government, which ultimately led to the gravest disasters of the German people). Since the interests of people and different social strata are not the same, and due to limited resources and other circumstances (for example, pressure from other groups), state power cannot satisfy the interests of all members and all strata of society, it satisfies the interests of the majority, minority, certain groups of society and only partially. Therefore, the legitimation of state power, with rare exceptions, apparently cannot be comprehensive. What is legitimate for some segments of the population (for example, for miners in Russia, demanding payment of wages, boarding rails and stopping traffic), is illegitimate and illegal for others (for example, for workers of those enterprises that do not receive goods necessary for life support ; for railway workers making appeals to miners). Therefore, the legitimacy of state power is usually assessed from the point of view of its compliance with the interests of the majority of the population and its ideas about power. The consequence of the legitimacy of state power is its authority among the population, recognition of the right to govern and consent to obey. Legitimacy increases the effectiveness of government power, based on the majority of the population.

The legitimacy of state power is expressed in its support by the population. This support can be expressed by thoughts, feelings, but above all by actions. It finds its expression in the results of voting in elections of parliament, president, and other bodies, in the results of referendums, in mass demonstrations of the population approving certain government measures, in mass demonstrations of the population in defense of state power during attempted coups. Support for state power or its absence can be evidenced by public surveys, questionnaires, and various public events (for example, organizing a nationwide discussion of a draft constitution).

The most distinct form of legitimation of power is social and political revolutions, if they express the genuine interests of the population, overthrowing the oppressive anti-popular government and establishing new state power. Another thing is that revolutionary violence brings with it violations of the former legality, shocks, often devastation and victims, and the new government does not always justify the aspirations of the people.

There are several main forms of legitimation of state power. The German political scientist M. Weber was the first to identify three of them: traditional, charismatic and rational. The first is associated with the customs and traditions of the population, often with the special role of religion, with personal, tribal, class dependence. The clearest example is the influence of customs and religion in many Muslim countries. In Great Britain, the preservation of the monarchical form of government (though with a virtually powerless monarch) is largely due to the special role of traditions in British society.

Charismatic legitimacy (charisma from the ancient Greek - “divine”) is due to the special qualities of outstanding individuals, less often - their teams, which are attributed qualities that can determine people’s behavior. Such qualities may include natural abilities, prophetic gifts, fortitude and words. The great conquering commanders (Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, etc.), as well as Hitler, De Gaulle, etc., had charisma. Charisma may be associated with a certain ideology (for example, the cult of personality of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee I.V. Stalin in the USSR, “socialist leader” Kim Il Sung in North Korea, ideologist of Nkrumahism, Ghanaian President in Africa Kwame Nkrumah). To strengthen charisma, ritual ceremonies are widely used (torchlight processions in Nazi Germany, parades, demonstrations in a certain uniform and with certain banners, signs, etc.).

Rational legitimation is based on reason: the population supports or rejects state power, guided by its own assessment of the activities of this power. The basis of rational legitimation is not slogans and promises; they have a relatively short-term effect, although, for example, promises of a future communist society, where people will work according to their abilities and receive according to their needs, have long contributed to the legitimation of state power in countries of totalitarian socialism. This basis is not the image of a benevolent and wise ruler, often not even fair laws (they are sometimes not fully implemented, for example the law on veterans in modern Russia), but the practical work of state bodies for the benefit of its population, compliance by state leaders and officials with established rules for all laws, and not creating privileges for oneself. The ethical behavior of the country's leaders, other officials in society, open and honest dialogue between the authorities and political parties, and other public associations of citizens is important. The authorities’ readiness for dialogue, the ability to listen to an opponent (and not just the desire to command and threaten), to understand the arguments of other participants in the dialogue, and to change, at least partially, their activities under the influence of these arguments is of great importance for the psychological influence on the population to legitimize state power.

There are other classifications of processes of legitimation and legitimacy as a result of these processes. The French author J. L. Chabot distinguishes between types of democratic, ideological, ontological (in accordance with the cosmic order of the universe) legitimacy.

Legal and legitimate state power presupposes submission to it. At the same time, since the time of F. Aquinas, disobedience to the oppressive secular authorities has been allowed. The right of the people to resist the oppressive government was enshrined in the US Declaration of Independence in 1776 (it was about the uprising of American colonists against the British royal government). Some modern constitutions of African countries that have experienced the brutal oppression of totalitarianism speak of the right to disobey the government, but using peaceful methods (including civil disobedience campaigns).

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of the work is that transformations of political systems, which have become an integral feature of the late 20th - early 21st centuries, inevitably affect the stability of political institutions and ways of their functioning. This fully relates to the problem of power.

The problem of legitimizing power in Russia is becoming more urgent as we move towards democratization of relations between institutions and political subjects. The increase in channels of political participation marks the democracy of political discourse, but at the same time creates additional problems for the ruling regime. The legitimacy of the ruling regime is beginning to be challenged due to the emergence and development of political competition. Claims to power on the part of various political actors become sufficiently conditional, which gives rise to a competitive political texture. At the same time, ruling regimes are interested in preserving the right to use power and minimizing delegitimation risks in the face of increased activity by opposition groups. In this regard, legitimacy appears to be a very important attribute of power, because its presence helps the government survive periods of instability. A high level of trust in the subject of power helps to overcome the unfavorable political situation, which, in turn, is confirmed by examples of a number of post-Soviet political regimes.

Despite the fact that various aspects of the legitimation of political power and the specificity of its reproduction in certain space-time continuums, one way or another, have already fallen into the research focus of the authors whose works were presented above, in the opinion of the dissertation author, they are absent in Russian political discourse comprehensive studies of the legitimation of political power.

Goal of the workconsists in a comprehensive study of the mechanisms of legitimation of political power, as well as their possible manifestations in Russia.

Achieving this goal required solving the following tasks:

· research into the formation and development of the definition of “legitimation of power”, as well as its possible discourses; determining the author’s position regarding the meaning of the definition of “legitimation of power”;

· analysis of existing theoretical models on the problem of legitimation and development on their basis of a theoretical structure that reflects modern trends in the development of political processes in the post-Soviet space;

· systematization of mechanisms of political legitimation and determination of their features and methods of functioning in the post-Soviet space;

· introducing into political analysis the method of political hermeneutics, which allows us to consider the legitimation of power through the mechanism of a political text;

· identifying the source base of crises of the legitimacy of political power.

1. Elections as a way of legal legitimation of state power

.1 The concept of legitimation of state power

legitimation political power hermeneutics

Legitimation of political powerrepresents a mutually dependent process, on the one hand, of “self-justification” and rational justification of one’s own power on the part of the “managers”, on the other, “justification” and recognition of this power on the part of the “managed”.

There are always social groups in society that disagree with the current government, therefore the legitimacy of state power cannot be universal.

Currently, the term “legitimation” is quite actively used in various humanities (philosophy, political science, sociology, jurisprudence, etc.), each of which fills the category in question with special semantic content. As a result, we have at least a dualism in the understanding of legitimation, which, while acceptable in principle, nevertheless invariably gives rise to difficulties of both epistemological and practical nature. Every time there is a need to clarify in which of two or more senses a given term is used in a particular context.

This problem manifests itself most acutely in jurisprudence, within which special requirements are imposed on the certainty of the categorical apparatus. Therefore, from the standpoint of methodology, first of all, it is necessary to define the concept of legitimation and its relationship with related categories.

When exploring the concept of legitimation, one should first of all proceed from the fact that the term in question has a legal origin (“legitimus” - legal). However, later, thanks to the efforts of representatives of other social sciences, this category began to be understood more broadly.

From the point of view of a broad approach, the concept of legitimation of state power includes two elements: political (recognition of power) and legal (its legitimation). In this case, the first one is the main one, and the second one is optional. Thus, legitimation here is a process not so much of legitimation as of recognition of power. A broad approach is characteristic not only of representatives of political science and sociology, but also of jurisprudence.

In a narrow sense, the legitimation of state power is the activity of citizens, public authorities, their officials, as well as public associations regulated by law for the legal certification (legitimation) of the state bodies and officials they institutionalize. With this approach, the legitimation of state power appears as an actual legal phenomenon.

“Placing order” in the categorical apparatus of jurisprudence does not at all mean a refusal to use a broad approach to the concept of legitimation in this science. The point is only to ensure that the existing dualism does not create confusion. At the same time, understanding legitimation as a process of recognition of power by the people has not only independent scientific significance for understanding the subject of the theory of state and law, but also complements and enriches the actual legal aspect of this phenomenon.

The relationship between the concepts of legitimacy and legality is the same as the relationship between the concepts of legitimation and legalization, with the only difference being that legitimation and legalization are a process, and legitimacy and legality are a property.

Legitimacy means the support of the government by the population. Legality indicates a legislatively based type of government. In some states, power can be legal and illegitimate, as, for example, during the rule of metropolises in colonial states, in others - legitimate, but illegal, as, say, after a revolutionary coup supported by the majority of the population, in others - both legal and legitimate , as, for example, after the victory of certain forces in free and fair elections.

1.2 Ways to legitimize state power

Over the past twenty years, there has been a transition of the system of power in Russia from the Soviet state of “thinking on behalf of the people and for the people” to the state of “thinking for oneself and within the limits of one’s jurisdiction.” Those. the government becomes an independent actor, and the people cease to be a single social subject and transform into civil society.

However, the transition to such a situation did not occur immediately. The Russian government in the 1990s there were quite a lot of problems with legitimacy, despite the emerging prospects for the population to gain long-awaited freedom and improve their standard of living.

An important factor of legitimacy was the recognition by the “world community” and “civilized countries” of the order that was created in post-Soviet Russia. This order was characterized by the spread of liberal values ​​and a market economy. Western countries' support for such a course was perceived by the majority of the population as a necessary condition for further successful development.

The concept of “legitimacy of power” was first introduced by the prominent German political scientist Max Weber. He also showed that legitimation (the acquisition of legitimacy by power) is not in all cases the same type of process, which has the same roots, the same basis.

In political science, the most popular classification was compiled by M. Weber, who, from the point of view of motivation for submission, identified the following types:

traditional legitimacy, formed on the basis of people’s belief in the necessity and inevitability of subordination to power, which receives in society (group) the status of tradition, custom, habit of obedience to certain persons or political institutions;

rational (democratic) legitimacy that arises as a result of people’s recognition of the fairness of those rational and democratic procedures on the basis of which the system of power is formed;

charismatic legitimacy that results from people's belief in what they recognize as the outstanding qualities of a political leader. This image of an infallible person endowed with exceptional qualities (charisma) is transferred by public opinion to the entire system of power. Unconditionally believing all the actions and plans of a charismatic leader, people uncritically accept the style and methods of his rule.

In addition to these methods of supporting power, a number of scientists identify others, giving legitimacy a more universal and dynamic character. Thus, the English researcher D. Held, along with the types of legitimacy already known to us, suggests talking about its types such as:

“consent under the threat of violence,” when people support the government, fearing threats from it, even a threat to their safety;

legitimacy based on the apathy of the population, indicating its indifference to the established style and forms of government;

pragmatic (instrumental) support, in which trust placed in the authorities is carried out in exchange for promises given by them of certain social benefits;

normative support, which presupposes the coincidence of political principles shared by the population and the authorities;

and finally, the highest normative support, meaning the complete coincidence of these kinds of principles.

Some scientists also identify an ideological type of legitimacy that provokes support for the authorities from public opinion as a result of active agitation and propaganda activities carried out by the ruling circles. There is also a patriotic type of legitimacy, in which a person’s pride in his country and its domestic and foreign policies is recognized as the highest criterion for supporting the authorities.

.3 The concept of elections. Election principles underlying the legitimation of state power

The features of the elections include the following:

Elections legitimize power. Through elections, the people determine their representatives and give them the mandate to exercise government power. As a result of elections, state power acquires the properties of legitimacy (recognition by the population) and legality (legality).

Elections are a special volitional phenomenon of socio-political life. They are designed to identify the will of voters and legitimize this will, so that on its basis the daily activities of public authorities are carried out.

Elections are a special type of legal activity as a set of actions and operations (deeds) aimed at the formation of legitimate government bodies in the relevant territory.

Elections are a special political and legal relationship. The essence of elections is that it is, first of all, the relationship between civil society and the state, the relationship between civil society and the state.

Elections represent a kind of socio-political contract of assignment between voters, on the one hand, and government bodies, on the other.

Thus, elections are one of the most important ways of legal legitimation of state power, which consists in vesting the people (population) of their individual representatives with power, as well as the activities of citizens, public associations, state bodies and local governments in compiling voter lists, nomination and registration candidates, voting and summing up its results, and conducting other electoral actions.

Election principles are mandatory requirements and conditions, without which any elections cannot be recognized as legal and legitimate.

Not all election principles identified in the literature are the basis for the legal legitimation of state power. In particular, it does not affect the process of legalization of state power at all: direct suffrage is in effect in the country or indirect. Indirect elections of the President of the United States are no less democratic and legitimate than direct elections of the President of the French Republic. Indirect elections as a system more reliably weed out random individuals, leaving more mature and reliable candidates. The same applies to the principle of voluntary participation in elections. Moreover, establishing a legal obligation for voters to take part in voting helps solve problems such as absenteeism (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, etc.).

The principles of legal legitimation of state power include only the following:

· The principle of freedom of elections is the main, fundamental principle. On the one hand, freedom of elections is the personal freedom of each voter, the so-called freedom of expression: a citizen expresses his will in elections absolutely freely, without any external coercion. On the other hand, this is objective freedom - free conditions for the preparation and conduct of elections: freedom of election campaigning (of course, in its legal forms), independence of election commissions from any illegal interference in their activities, an effective system for protecting the electoral rights of citizens, etc. .

· Alternativeity as a necessary condition for free elections relates to the very essence of electoral law. If by voting day there are no candidates left, or the number of registered candidates remains less than or equal to the established number of mandates, or only one list of candidates is registered, the elections are postponed by decision of the relevant election commission.

The requirement for alternative elections can lead (and often leads in practice) to the unfair use by other persons of their electoral rights, not for the purpose of exercising their right to hold an elective position, but for the purpose of impeding the holding of free elections, impeding the free expression of the will of citizens. It has become a technique of “black” electoral technologies for other candidates to withdraw their candidacies in order to prevent the election of a clear leader of the electoral race within the established period. Moreover, this is possible not only in the second round of elections. The provisions of the Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation,” which allow the use of such techniques, do not comply with the constitutional principles of holding elections. At the same time, elections cannot be considered free, since voters are deprived of the right to elect a person who deserves their trust within a prescribed period, only because other candidates refused to participate in the electoral process. This violates Part 3 of Article 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

· Secret ballot. The requirement for elections to be held by secret ballot is based on Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that elections “shall be conducted by secret ballot or by other equivalent means ensuring freedom of voting.” The procedure for secret voting should be described in more detail in election laws. Currently, the anonymity of voting may be violated.

· Mandatory elections. This principle first of all means that elections are an imperative way of forming government bodies elected by the population. Other options for acquiring elective powers contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation and current federal legislation and cannot be qualified otherwise as a violation of the foundations of the constitutional system of the Russian state. The mandatory nature of elections also implies that the competent state and municipal bodies do not have the right to evade their appointment and conduct within the time limits established by law, as well as to cancel already scheduled elections or postpone them to a later date.

· Periodicity. Free and fair elections in accordance with international standards must be held periodically. This is a very important provision, since one-time elections (for example, during the period of independence of a country or during the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy) are not sufficient to ensure stable democratic development of the state.

2. Political problems of ensuring the electoral legitimation of state power

.1 Problems of legal regulation of the electoral legitimation of state power

Political power in Russia, in order to be legitimate, must correspond to one degree or another to different cultural types: archaic - ancient Russian folk type; traditionalist - Orthodox-Slavic and social-socialist; modern - liberal-Western type of culture.

In modern Russia there is a need for moral policy. A situation is emerging in the country when the idea that all the difficulties experienced by the country are directly related to dishonesty, deception, corruption and theft at all levels of the socio-political hierarchy begins to prevail in public opinion, which is confirmed by corruption scandals in government structures. In the wake of mass moral indignation, the idea is born that as soon as we put an end to the theft of the country and the robbery of the people, everything will get better and all problems will be resolved by themselves.

A number of circumstances encourage people to view political power through the prism of moral values: the low standard of living of a significant part of the population, causing discomfort, irritation and anger; confidence that political power is losing the ability to change anything “from above”; society’s conviction that it is not involved in the “troubles” and “troubles” in the country; the presence in society of demagogic political forces and figures exposing the immorality of politicians in power. A significant part of the population in our country is beginning to turn to the idea of ​​“honesty” in power as the only possible means of improving life and bringing order to the country.

It seems that the main reason for the inability of the authorities to fulfill their social functions is the gap between the authorities and the people. But this gap is not only due to power, which is evidence of a one-sided approach. Power becomes what a person makes it, based on his needs, understanding of the essence of power and corresponding expectations from it.

The government must govern adequately to the demands placed on it in accordance with the dynamic and qualitative changes of the modern world. Russia is moving to a new stage of social self-organization, with increased demands on individuals, state and public institutions. Due to new tasks, the system of power must be built in such a way as not to suppress the diversity of interests in society, to strive for consent and solidarity of all its members, and citizens must show tolerance and mutual understanding.

The provisions of the domestic electoral legislation, which establish only two electoral qualifications - age and residence - are too liberal and do not correspond to the current level of development of Russian society and the state. There are no such liberal legislative provisions even in such developed countries as the USA, Great Britain, Iceland, etc. It is possible that the list of electoral qualifications should be expanded. Thus, it is necessary to introduce educational and language qualifications in the elections of the President of the Russian Federation and other senior officials, as well as to establish a ban on running for these positions for citizens with a criminal record and citizenship of a foreign state. It makes sense to think about the possibility of introducing other qualifications, taking into account the experience of foreign countries (preventing clergy, military personnel, civil servants, bankrupts, persons convicted of falsifying elections, etc. from participating in elections).

Equal suffrage means that voters have equal opportunities to influence the outcome of elections.

A violation of this principle is the possibility and admissibility of deviations in the number of voters in different districts, as laid down in the legislation. In practice, this leads to the fact that the share of votes in some constituent entities of the Russian Federation is 10-20 times greater than in others. It seems to us advisable to conduct an election campaign in territorial single-mandate constituencies formed with an equal number of voters, without taking into account the federal aspect. In this case, it should be taken into account that the constituent entities of the Russian Federation have equal representation in the Federation Council.

It is hardly possible to recognize the existing principle of “double voting” of deputies of the State Duma as corresponding to international electoral standards, meaning the possibility of candidates nominated by “electoral associations” simultaneously running on the federal list and in single-mandate electoral districts. In this case, preference is given to candidates from electoral associations, according to compared with independent candidates nominated in single-mandate constituencies, since the entire party propaganda machine works for such candidates. Probably, when adopting this norm, the legislator was guided by political considerations of the establishment of a multi-party system in the country. Of course, multi-party system is a fundamental element of free, fair and genuine elections. However, By developing political pluralism in the country, the legislator is encroaching on equal suffrage, recognized by the world community as the basis of electoral law.

Improving electoral legislation is one of the priority areas for the development of the Russian electoral system. It seems that the most promising measures in this regard may be the implementation of the following measures:

· increasing the hierarchical level of legislative regulation of the basic principles and categories of electoral law by giving them a constitutional form and meaning. To do this, it is necessary to allocate a special chapter in the structure of the Russian Constitution dedicated to the electoral system.

· overcoming conflicts within the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, Article 32 establishes the right of citizens to elect and be elected. This norm is not without internal contradictions and inaccuracies. In particular, it notes that persons recognized by the court as incompetent and who are in places of deprivation of civil service do not have voting rights and their right to participate in the administration of justice, enshrined in parts 4 and 5 of the same 32nd article. From a formal point of view, it turns out that since the restrictions established by part 3 of Article 32 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation concern only the electoral rights of citizens, then incapacitated people have the right to participate in other forms of exercising the right of citizens to participate in the management of state affairs - the administration of justice, public service and referendum citizens, as well as citizens imprisoned by a court verdict. According to the author, it would be advisable to extend restrictions on the voting rights of citizens to other political rights and freedoms. In addition, the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and electoral laws should be clarified: citizens who are in prison by a court verdict that has entered into legal force do not have political rights.

· vesting the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation with the right of legislative initiative on issues within its jurisdiction, the right to submit a request to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, as well as strengthening the role of the Central Election Commission of Russia as a kind of scientific and methodological center for improving electoral legislation.

· the creation of a special chamber in the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation or a separate judicial structure that will deal with the resolution of election disputes and consider cases of violations of the electoral rights of citizens, since issues of electoral rights are quite complex and require special qualifications.

2.2 Political and legal analysis of federal elections in Russia (1999-2007)

To a greater extent, the legitimacy of political power in modern Russia is acquired thanks to the legal method of forming power institutions. These were the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, 2004, parliamentary elections of 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003, during which to a certain extent there was a distancing of the position from its holder, personal authority from the authority of the position, because in maintaining the position of President many Russians seems to be a guarantee of successful reformation in Russia. State power that has found support among the population of the country has a chance to be effective in its political, economic and social activities, since it enjoys support, authority and does not encounter opposition in its functioning.

Another direction of legitimation is associated not so much with setting and justifying “great goals”, but with the search for effective ways to solve pressing problems of Russian society. Measures taken by the political authorities related to the implementation of national projects, overcoming poverty, combating official corruption, and increasing the efficiency of the state apparatus contribute to the restoration of its legitimacy. But since such initiatives usually come from the President, whose public trust rating is consistently high, the level of legitimacy of other branches of government is low.

Let's take a look at the most recent elections, 2007. Elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federationof the fifth convocation took place on December 2, 2007. These are the first elections in which the barrier for parties entering the Duma on party lists was raised from 5% to 7%. In addition, the lower turnout threshold and the possibility of voting against everyone were legislatively removed, the majoritarian system and voting in single-mandate constituencies were abolished, members of one party were prohibited from running on the lists of another, and parties were prohibited from uniting into electoral blocs; Independent Russian observers were banned (retained only from parties). Observers from European structures (OSCE and PACE), as well as opposition Russian parties and public figures, assessed the elections as unfree, unfair and held with numerous violations; opposition parties accuse the authorities of falsifying their results. Observers from the CIS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization assess the elections as free and fair. The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation also does not believe that falsification took place.

According to the voting results, there were no major changes in the distribution of seats in the State Duma. “United Russia” retained a qualified majority, sufficient for the sole adoption of any decisions in the State Duma without taking into account the opinions of other deputies.

Representatives of the opposition claim that measures will be taken against the heads of cities and regions in which United Russia received a relatively low percentage of votes, including deprivation of positions. In Udmurtia, the mayor of Glazov, Vladimir Pereshein, submitted his resignation. In Glazov, United Russia received 41% of the votes. However, among the heads of regions with relatively low support for United Russia were Yuri Luzhkov (54.15%), Valentina Matvienko (50.33%), and Boris Gromov. According to the political scientist, these regions in these elections could not boast of 100% turnout and the same support for Putin, since in megacities there is a problem of total mobilization of the electorate, which distinguishes them from some Caucasian republics.

According to the results of these elections and the fact that the United Russia party was politically headed by V.V. Putin, a political system with a dominant party has been strengthened in Russia, in which United Russia can single-handedly make any decisions in the Russian parliament without taking into account the opinions of other parties. Portugal, which held the presidency of the European Union in 2007, issued a statement on behalf of the EU that the elections held in Russia on December 2 did not meet international standards and the obligations undertaken by Russia. German Chancellor Merkel criticized the Russian elections from Germany. She emphasized that the government “constantly limits the ability of human rights defenders to express their own opinions.

This situation can be explained by different bases of legitimation. Presidential power as the supreme power is legitimized mainly by the cultural archetype and correlates, first of all, with the moral ideal of Truth, based on patriarchal statism, the belief in a “miracle” on the part of a moderate authoritarian leader, endowed to a certain extent with charismatic traits. The qualities of the President are judged not on the basis of what qualities he actually possesses, but on the basis of what the highest authority should have. Because of this, the level of legitimacy of presidential power in Russia will always be higher than the level of legitimacy of other branches of government.

The executive branch (government) in Russia is expected to be socially efficient, which is sanctioned by mentality and is of a consciously evaluative nature. Currently, this concept hides the ability of the government to implement policies that meet the expectations of various groups of the population and maintain social order in society.

The legitimation of representative institutions of state power in the Russian mentality is carried out through the correlation of their activities with the principle of conciliarity as “the will to agreement,” and not “the will to power.” The majority of the population does not pin their hopes on the legislative bodies.

The legitimacy of the judicial branch of government is low due to its bias and susceptibility to corruption, as a result of which citizens' hopes for fair justice are low.

The legitimacy of political power in modern Russia is based, first of all, on the expectations of the people associated with the personality of the president, the establishment of political stability, the demonstration of the power of its steps aimed at improving the standard of living of people, the formulation of such a problem by the President of Russia, the acceleration of economic development of the country, the redistribution of money funds from the rich to the poor, the creation of the legislative framework necessary to carry out these changes in society, the effective work of the legislative and executive branches of government. Such steps, supported by real results, are a necessary condition for Russian citizens to recognize the right of the authorities to lead the state.

3. Legitimation of political power in modern conditions of development of federalism (using the example of St. Petersburg)

1 Reflection of electoral processes in the mass consciousness of modern Russian society (using the example of St. Petersburg)

Effective formation of a “corps” of political parties that were supposed to compete for seats in the State Duma in 2007 is impossible without taking into account the political preferences of citizens, especially in such significant constituent entities of the Russian Federation as St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. The authorities are really interested in the so-called “democratic legitimation”, when the population must be convinced of the correctness of all actions taken by the authorities a priori, which will serve as an additional guarantee of maintaining political stability even if active “oil injections” into the country’s economy cease. In addition, the decision taken by the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg to form the next composition of the deputy corps on the basis of party lists makes it relevant not only to carefully monitor the party preferences of voters based on surveys using a “questionnaire of a simple structure”, but also to reconstruct the semantic space of their political consciousness (assessment of the combination of various political values ​​in their consciousness).

Research conducted in 2007 in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region made it possible to determine the level of support for the current party in power, which over the past year and a half has positioned itself primarily as conservative or centrist. In 2007, in the mass consciousness of residents of the two regions, the strongest position was that of United Russia, which formally (according to one-dimensional distribution data) enjoys the greatest trust and support of the adult population of St. Petersburg (about 35%) and the Leningrad region (about 22%) . Taking into account the fact that the majority of people who expressed confidence in the party in power are active voters, the share of “voting for it today” is close to 50%.

However, one cannot fail to take into account that a significant part of the residents of these two regions - 67 and 60.3% of voters in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, respectively - believe that none of the existing parties is close to them and does not express their interests, that they are outcasts, whose interests and needs are not important to any political force. In addition, the total number of actual members in all political parties is less than 2% of the population of these regions. Finally, in St. Petersburg, “United Russia” is “rather distrusted” by 14.1% of residents and “not trusted at all” by 37.1%. This means that the party in power has such a high anti-rating that the possibility of continued significant real growth in the ranks of its supporters raises reasonable doubt. To be fair, we note that the anti-rating of trust of the population of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region in other political parties represented in the current composition of the State Duma is even higher (74% for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 72 for the LDPR, 69% for Rodina ).

In addition to fairly high ratings of trust and support for United Russia by the population of the two regions (with “off-scale” indicators of general distrust of all parties, including the party in power), there is also a common trend of changes in the social structure of its supporters. It is important that people with higher education are increasingly inclined to give preference to this party. Among the supporters of the variants of the parties in power in the 1990s - early 2000s. a significant predominance was among people with secondary vocational and special education, and those with higher education (including the notorious “state employees” from among the humanitarian intelligentsia and technical specialists) were oriented primarily towards liberal or opposition parties, regardless of whether they were represented in the State Duma .

Both among St. Petersburg residents and among residents of the Leningrad region, to a greater extent than other categories of the population, men with complete secondary education, people over 60 years of age, and unemployed pensioners tend to distrust United Russia (the costs of the first and second stages of “monetization of benefits” continue to affect "). More precisely, although at least 26% of pensioners of all ages support this party, the actual share of pensioners who consider it “theirs” is less than expected (this is clearly evidenced by standardized balances).

However, the main factor in support for United Russia in both federal subjects in the North-West remains loyalty to the president and governors, that is, this political organization is perceived by residents not only as the party in power, but precisely as the “face” of the executive branch. This is especially clearly evidenced by the attitudes of older people living in the Leningrad region, where the conviction that “the governor has done a lot for the region” directly correlates with voting for United Russia in 2003 and the idea of ​​it as a party that is better everything that expresses their interests.

To determine the attitude of pensioners to the work of the governor, the analysis took into account the following indicators of aspects of life in their area as independent assessment variables: the transport situation (public transport), public services of residential buildings (condition of the housing and communal services), heat and electricity supply to the housing stock, provision of telephone communications, availability of jobs in the district (the authorities' fight against unemployment), the state of schools and kindergartens, the quality of work of district authorities (overcoming bureaucracy, red tape), the state of clinics, the organization of medical care for the population, social protection of the poor, the crime situation in the region ( crime level). The analysis showed that the dissatisfaction of older people with the activities of the governor of the Leningrad region is associated with low assessments of the quality of life in their own area (at their place of residence) to a greater extent than with a negative assessment of their own life. The accuracy of the model when including the listed independent variables was 77.1%, the values ​​of the canonical correlation coefficients and Wilks’ Lambda were very high, however, based on the indicators of the significance level, it became clear that the assessment of the governor’s work included such parameters of the quality of life of pensioners in a particular area as the condition of schools and kindergartens, the level of telephone coverage and quality of communication, social protection of the poor and the quality of work of district authorities do not have a strong enough influence.

After excluding these variables, the accuracy of the estimate for the entire final model as a whole was 76.4% (it meets the standard, since it exceeds 74%), and specifically for identifying the group of those dissatisfied with the work of the governor - 91.1% (a very high figure).

Let us highlight the most significant differences in attitudes towards the current party in power in two neighboring regions of the Russian Federation. The first difference concerns the fundamentally different attitude towards “United Russia” among the humanitarian intelligentsia, engineering and technical workers in general (for example, representatives of the education and health care systems). These groups in St. Petersburg continue to distrust the party in power, while public sector employees from these areas living in the Leningrad region are increasingly joining the “banners” of its supporters. This discrepancy, in our opinion, is due to differences in the economic development of these regions and the characteristics of the metropolis, where public sector employees have more opportunities to find additional income and, therefore, are less dependent on the policies of the ruling party.

The second difference concerns potential voters aged 25-29. If this group of young people living in St. Petersburg is inclined to trust and support United Russia, then a similar part of the residents of the Leningrad region falls, rather, into the group of staunch opponents of the party. For example, the willingness to vote for United Russia among residents of the region under the age of 30 is one and a half times lower than among people belonging to the middle age group (19 and 27.5% in the corresponding age groups).

The third difference concerns the potential for expanding the social support base. In St. Petersburg, United Russia still has prospects for some increase in the ranks of its supporters at the expense of city residents with incomplete secondary education, workers, managers, trade workers, military personnel and students. United Russia is trusted by a significant portion of people who consider themselves conservatives, social democrats, or those with mixed views. The party in power should pay special attention to military personnel, whose sympathies are distributed between conservatives and communists.

However, a certain set of political values ​​must correspond to the conservative views of the population. Awareness of one's views as conservative does not yet say anything about the real characteristics of political consciousness, in particular about the attitude towards values. The political attitudes of St. Petersburg residents who consider themselves conservatives are quite vague. Firstly, the only canonical value that they certainly share is the preservation of traditions. Supporters of the party in power tend to recognize the priority of the interests of the state over the rights of citizens, but values ​​such as private property and wealth are not very significant for these people. Moreover, St. Petersburg residents who consider themselves conservatives are not inclined to believe that the presence of a layer of rich people is an indicator of the prosperity of society as a whole. Secondly, in their minds there are elements of egalitarian attitudes that should be present, rather, in the minds of supporters of communist ideology. The conservatism of United Russia adherents is also manifested in their paternalism, since they tend to put the interests of the state above the interests of the individual. Thirdly, in the minds of supporters of conservatism there is a powerful statist dominant. They are ready to give up part of their civil rights and freedoms if this is necessary for the state to fight terrorism. Thus, the topic of state security is a win-win card with the help of which the federal government can change the nature of the political regime without fear of reducing the level of social stability. Fourthly, adherents of this party simultaneously advocate asymmetrical values. For example, most of them are characterized by a focus on combining human rights and justice, preserving traditions and carrying out reforms.

3.2 Reform of the electoral system in the 2000s. (using the example of St. Petersburg)

Changes in electoral legislation were tested in regional elections in 2007. Let us consider the features of these changes using the example of St. Petersburg. After the completion of the election campaign for the election of deputies of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg, on the basis of the first copies of protocols on voting results received from territorial election commissions, the St. Petersburg Election Commission, after preliminary checking the correctness of the preparation of these protocols by summing up the data contained in them no later than 10 days after voting day determines the election results.

Lists of candidates are allowed for the distribution of deputy mandates, each of which received 7 or more percent of the votes of voters who took part in the voting, provided that there were at least two such lists and that in total more than 50 percent of the votes of voters who took part were cast for these lists in voting. In this case, other lists of candidates are not allowed to distribute deputy mandates.

Within seven days from the voting day, a candidate on the list of candidates may refuse to receive a deputy mandate. An application to renounce a deputy mandate cannot be withdrawn. The refusal of a candidate on the list of candidates to receive a deputy mandate entails a change in the order of placing candidates on the corresponding list of candidates.

The St. Petersburg Election Commission calculates the sum of votes cast in a single electoral district for each list of candidates admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates. The number of deputy seats distributed across a single electoral district is 50.

The number of votes received by each list of candidates admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates is divided sequentially by numbers from an increasing series of natural numbers (divisors) from two to 50.

The quotients, determined to the sixth decimal place, obtained from all lists of candidates admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates, are distributed in descending order in the auxiliary row. Next, the quotient is determined whose serial number in the auxiliary series is 50 (fiftieth quotient).

If two or more quotients in the auxiliary row are equal to the fiftieth quotient, then first, from these quotients, the quotient of the list of candidates who received a greater number of votes is added to the auxiliary row, and in the case of a tie of votes, the quotient of the list of candidates registered earlier is added.

The number of members of the corresponding list of candidates located in the auxiliary row, the serial numbers of which are less than or equal to 50, is the number of deputy mandates that the corresponding list of candidates receives.

After the distribution of deputy mandates provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, they are distributed within each list of candidates between the citywide and territorial parts of the list of candidates. First of all, deputy mandates are transferred to candidates included in the citywide part of the list of candidates, in the order of their placement in the specified list.

If, after the transfer of deputy mandates to candidates included in the citywide part of the list of candidates, there remain deputy mandates due to this list of candidates, these mandates are distributed within the list of candidates between its territorial parts in the following order: candidates included in the territorial part of the list of candidates in the territories are recognized as elected deputies , in which the list of candidates received the largest percentage of votes compared to other territories from the number of people who took part in the vote (based on the number of valid ballots). The total number of deputy mandates distributed in this way should not exceed the total number of deputy mandates received by the electoral association as a result of voting, taking into account the distribution of deputy mandates between candidates who are in the citywide part of the list of candidates. The percentage of votes is determined accurate to the sixth decimal place, and if it is equal, preference is given to the territorial part of the list of candidates for which a greater number of votes were cast.

Amount1Number of voters included in the voter list at the end of voting37026692Number of ballots received by the PEC30895723Number of ballots issued by the PEC to voters inside the voting premises on voting day11998174Number of ballots issued to voters who voted outside the voting premises on voting day319755Number of canceled ballots185 76986Number of ballots contained in portable voting boxes319527Number ballots contained in stationary voting boxes11965768Number of invalid ballots375019Number of valid ballots119102710Number of lost ballots9411Number of ballots not counted upon receipt12Number of votes cast for each list121. St. Petersburg branch of the Political Party "United Russia"459047 37.36%132. St. Petersburg branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation196851 16.02%143. St. Petersburg branch of the Party “A JUST RUSSIA: MOTHERLAND/PENSIONERS/LIFE”269050 21.90%154. St. Petersburg branch of “PATRIOTS OF RUSSIA”68798 5.60%165. St. Petersburg branch of “LDPR”133742 10.88%176. "UNION OF RIGHT FORCES"63539 5.17%

We will also present the results of the federal elections to the Duma in St. Petersburg. The turnout in the elections of deputies to the State Duma of Russia of the fifth convocation in St. Petersburg was 51.68%. As expected, the leader of the vote was United Russia - it received 53.34% of the votes. The 7 percent barrier guaranteeing seats in the new parliament was also overcome by A Just Russia - 15.13%, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - 12.46%, and the Liberal Democratic Party - 7.48%. 5.06% of voters voted for Yabloko in St. Petersburg, 2.59% for the Union of Right Forces, 2.41% for the Agrarian Party, and 2.21% for the Civil Force party. "Patriots of Russia" received 1.01% of the votes, the Social Justice Party - 0.25%, and the Democratic Party of Russia - 0.14%.

Conclusion

The main conclusions from the work are as follows:

Legitimate power is usually characterized as lawful and fair. Legitimacy is associated with the belief of the vast majority of the population that the existing order is the best for a given country. “Legitimacy” and legality are close, but not identical concepts. The first is more solitary, ethical in nature, while the second is legal. Historically, several types of legitimacy have emerged:

legal type of legitimacy - legitimation of power by specific legal norms, a constitution, supported by the activities of relevant institutions, including coercive sanctions; The basis is a general understanding of the norms established by law;

ideological type of legitimacy - recognition of power due to internal conviction or faith in the correctness of those ideological values ​​​​proclaimed by power; The basis is ideological values;

traditional legitimacy - recognition of power as legitimate because it acts in accordance with the traditions and traditional values ​​of the masses; The basis is traditions, traditional consciousness;

structural legitimacy - the legitimacy of power stems from the belief in the legitimacy and value of established structures and norms governing political relations; The basis is specific political structures;

personal (charismatic) legitimacy - recognition of power is based on the faith of the masses in the special abilities of the political leader, leader; The basis is the personal authority of the ruler.

The analysis shows that different institutions of Russian government (the President, the Duma, regional authorities) have different forms of legitimacy.

List of used literature

1.Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted on December 12, 1993) M.: Prospekt, 2003 - 192 p.

2.Federal Law of June 12, 2002 No. 67-FZ “On the basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in a referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation” (as amended and supplemented on September 27, December 24, 2002, June 23, July 4 , December 23, 2003, June 7, 2004)

.Federal Law of May 19, 1995 No. 82-FZ “On Public Associations” (as amended and supplemented by May 17, 1997, July 19, 1998, March 12, 21, July 25, 2002, December 8 2003, June 29, 2004)

.Federal Law of January 10, 2003 No. 19-FZ “On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation”

.Federal Law of December 20, 2002 No. 175-FZ “On the election of deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” (as amended and supplemented by December 20, 2002, June 23, 2003)

6.Federal Law of October 6, 2003 No. 131-FZ “On the general principles of organizing local self-government in the Russian Federation” (as amended and supplemented by June 19, 2004).

.Baglay M.V. Constitutional law of the Russian Federation M.: Norma, 2002 - 800 p.

8.Blyakher L.E., Ogurtsova T.L. Adventures of the legitimacy of power in Russia, or the restoration of the presumption of guilt // Polis. 2006. No. 3.

9.Volkov Yu., Lubsky A., Makarenko V., Kharitonov E. Legitimacy of political power: Methodological problems and Russian realities. M., 1996.

.Dakhin A.A. The system of state power in Russia: phenomenological transit // Polis. 2006. No. 3.

11.Constitution of the Russian Federation: commentary / edited by B.N. Topornina, Yu.M. Baturina, R.G. Orekhova. M.: “Legal Literature”, 2004 - 624 p.

12.Lyubimov A.P. “On public (public) control over computer vote counting during elections” // Legislation, 1998, No. 1, pp. 18-25.

.Lutzer V.L. State power and local self-government // Legislation, 2000, No. 9, pp. 44 - 49

.Scientific and practical commentary on the Constitution of the Russian Federation / Rep. ed. V.V. Lazarev M.: Lawyer, 2005 - 400 p.

.Tolkachev K.B. Constitutions and charters of the subjects of the Federation. Ufa: Tau, 2003 - 272 s.

The concept of legitimation of state power seems more complex. Legitimus means legal, legalized, like legalization, but this concept is not legal, but factual, although legal elements may be part of it. The modern meaning of this concept is associated with the research of political scientists, primarily the German scientist Max Weber (1864-1920).

Legitimation often has nothing to do with the law at all, and sometimes even contradicts it. This is a process, not necessarily formal and even most often informal, through which state power acquires the property of legitimacy, i.e. a state that expresses the correctness, justification, expediency, legality and other aspects of the compliance of a specific state power with the attitudes and expectations of the individual, social and other groups, and society as a whole. Recognition of state power and its actions as legitimate is based on sensory perception, experience, and rational assessment. It is based not on external signs (although, for example, the oratorical abilities of leaders can have a significant impact on the public, contributing to the establishment of charismatic power), but on internal motivations, internal incentives. The legitimation of state power is not associated with the publication of a law, the adoption of a constitution (although this may also be part of the legitimation process), but with a complex of experiences and internal attitudes of people, with the ideas of various segments of the population about compliance with state power; by its bodies the norms of social justice, human rights, and their protection.

Illegitimate power is based on violence and other forms of coercion, including mental influence, but legitimation cannot be imposed on people from the outside, for example, by force of arms or the revelation of a “good” constitution by a monarch to his people. It is created by people’s devotion to a certain social system (sometimes to a certain person), which expresses the immutable values ​​of existence. The basis of this kind of devotion is the belief of people that their benefits depend on the preservation and support of a given order, a given state power, the belief that they express the interests of the people. Therefore, the legitimation of state power is always connected with the interests of people, various segments of the population. And since the interests and needs of various groups, due to limited resources and other circumstances, can only be partially satisfied or only the demands of some groups can be fully satisfied, the legitimation of state power in society, with rare exceptions, cannot have a comprehensive, universal character: what is legitimate for some, appears as illegitimate for others. One can cite many examples of the different interests of certain segments of the population and their unequal, often opposite, attitudes towards the measures of state power and towards the government itself. Therefore, its legitimation is not associated with the approval of the entire society (this is an extremely rare option), but with acceptance by the majority of the population while respecting and protecting the rights of the minority. It is this, and not the dictatorship of a class, that makes state power legitimate.

Legitimation of state power gives it the necessary authority in society. The majority of the population voluntarily and consciously submits to it, the legal demands of its bodies and representatives, which gives it stability, stability, and the necessary degree of freedom in the implementation of state policy. The higher the level of legitimation of state power, the wider the opportunities for leading society with minimal “force” costs and expenditures of “managerial energy”, with greater freedom for self-regulation of social processes. At the same time, the legitimate government has the right and obligation, in the interests of society, to apply coercive measures provided for by law if other methods of stopping antisocial actions do not produce results.

But an arithmetic majority cannot always serve as the basis for genuine legitimation of state power. The majority of Germans under Hitler's regime adopted a policy of "race cleansing" and territorial claims, which ultimately led to great misfortune for the German people. Consequently, not all assessments of the majority make state power truly legitimate. The decisive criterion is its compliance with universal human values. Chirkin V.E. Legalization and legitimation of state power [Electronic resource] // State and law. - M.: Nauka, 1995, No. 8. - P. 65-73

The legitimation of state power is assessed not by the words of its representatives (although this is important), not by the texts of the programs and laws it has adopted (although this is important), but by its practical activities, by the way it resolves fundamental issues in the life of society and each individual. The population sees the difference between slogans about reforms and democracy, on the one hand, and authoritarian ways of making decisions that are most important for the fate of the country and the people, on the other.

The legitimation of state power can and, as a rule, includes its legalization. But legitimation is in conflict with formal legalization if legal laws do not correspond to the norms of justice, general democratic values, and attitudes prevailing among the majority of the country's population. In this case, legitimation is either absent (for example, the population has a negative attitude towards the totalitarian order established by the authorities), or in the course of revolutionary events, national liberation movements, another legitimation occurs - anti-state, rebel, pre-state power established in the liberated areas, which then becomes state power power.

Legitimation is usually associated with the legal analysis of the preparation and adoption of the constitution, with the study of decisions of constitutional courts and other bodies of constitutional control, and with the analysis of data from elections and referendums. Less attention is paid to the content of constitutional acts, the nature of the activities of state power, comparison of the programs of political parties and the policies pursued by those in power. Very rare is the scientific analysis of programs in comparison with the actions of various high officials.

It is even more difficult to identify indicators of legitimation. In this case, the results of elections and referendums are also used, but in the first case, falsification is common, and the second does not always reflect the true sentiments of the people, since these results are determined by transitory factors. In many developing countries with a one-party system (Ghana, Burma, Algeria, etc.), in parliamentary and presidential elections the ruling party received an overwhelming majority of votes, but the same population remained completely indifferent to the military coups that overthrew this government. At the 1991 referendum on the question of preserving the USSR, the majority of voters gave an affirmative answer, but a few months later the USSR collapsed due to the indifference of a significant part of the same voters. Thus, formal assessments used in legalization require a deep and comprehensive analysis when determining the legitimacy of state power. http://filosof.historic.ru/books/item/f00/s01/z0001084/st000.shtml

Thus, the legitimation of state power is associated not with the publication of a law, the adoption of a constitution, but with a complex of experiences and internal attitudes of people, with the ideas of various segments of the population about compliance with state power; by its bodies the norms of social justice, human rights, and their protection. The legitimation of state power is assessed not by the words of its representatives, not by the texts of the programs and laws it has adopted, but by its practical activities, by the ways it resolves fundamental issues in the life of society and each individual.

• Subject and tasks of philosophy of law
  • Subject of philosophy of law. Philosophical and legal reflection
    • Justification of the need for philosophy of law
    • The essence and features of the philosophical approach to law
  • Philosophy of law in the system of sciences, its main issues and functions
    • Structure of legal philosophy
    • Basic questions of legal philosophy
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  • The essence of legal methodology and its levels
  • Basic types of legal understanding: legal positivism and natural law thinking
    • Natural legal thinking
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    • Legal subjectivism
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• Philosophical and legal thought of the Ancient East
  • General characteristics of the conditions for the origin and development of philosophical and legal ideas of the Ancient East
  • Ethical teachings of Ancient India as a prerequisite for the emergence of philosophical and legal ideas
    • Buddhism, Jainism
  • Philosophical and legal ideas in Ancient China
    • Mohism
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• Philosophy of law of antiquity and the Middle Ages
  • The emergence and development of philosophical and legal views in the ancient period
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    • Philosophical justification of law by Plato
    • Peculiarities of Aristotle's views on law
    • Philosophy of law of the late classical era
  • Features of philosophical and legal thought in the Middle Ages
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• Philosophical and legal doctrines in Western Europe at the end of the 18th - mid-19th centuries
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• Philosophical and legal thought in Russia
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• Legal ontology: nature and structure of law
  • Ontological nature of law. Legal reality
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• Legal anthropology: the humanistic nature of law
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  • Philosophical meaning and justification of human rights
  • Personality and law. Humanistic nature of law
• Legal axiology: value foundations of law value foundations of law
  • Values ​​in law and law as a value
    • Three main forms of existence of values
  • Freedom as a value. Law as a form of freedom
  • Justice as a basic legal value
• Universal and culturally specific in the value dimension of law
  • Legal consciousness as a problem of legal philosophy
  • Law and Morality
  • Universal-civilizational-specific-cultural in legal consciousness
• Institutional dimension of law. Philosophical problems of law and power in a post-totalitarian society
  • Political and legal institutions and their role in the implementation of law
    • State and law
    • The concept of legitimacy and legitimation
  • Philosophical problems of law and power in a transforming society
    • The concept of a legal society and the prospects for its formation in Russia

The concept of legitimacy and legitimation

Coercion and violence are not the only means of power to achieve its goals. As a rule, the ruling elite of society is forced to resort to physical coercion only in exceptional cases, when all other resources of power have been exhausted. The latter, for example, includes people's habit of submission, their fear, indifference, traditions or the belief that the ruling elite expresses the interests of the masses.

This means that political dominance involves not only coercion on the part of the ruling minority, but also the consent of the majority to obey. As the Russian philosopher S. Frank emphasized: “Rule, like any social institution, is a two-way relationship: not only the ruler, but the ruler and the subordinate jointly enter into the relationship of domination and actively build it.” In other words, coercion and voluntary submission are complementary aspects of political and legal relations.

In the philosophy of law, the power that is accepted by the masses of the people and is based on their voluntary consent to obey, and is not imposed on them by force, is called legitimate. Such legitimate (from the Latin legitimus - legal) power is perceived by the population as lawful and fair. On the contrary, if the ruling group does not enjoy the people's trust and is forced to constantly resort to means of coercion, then the power of such a group is usually considered illegitimate.

Another concept close in meaning to the concept of “legitimacy” is “legitimation”. Legitimation is a procedure for public recognition or confirmation of the legality of any right or authority of an actor, as well as recognition of the legality of existing political and legal relations, the prevailing regime of power, its explanation or justification.

The legitimacy of a political phenomenon does not mean its legally formalized legality, and therefore legitimation should not be confused with legalization, and legitimacy with legality, that is, with legality. Legitimation does not have legal functions and is not a legal process. Legitimation affirms politics and power, explains and justifies political decisions, the creation of political structures, their change and renewal, etc. At the same time, it is a necessary condition for compliance with laws.

Types of legitimation. As an analysis of political and legal relations emerging in different countries and at different historical stages shows, there are very diverse bases for legitimation. Therefore, they are usually classified into different types. The classical typology of legitimation, which has not lost its significance to this day, was proposed by M. Weber. He reduces all the diversity of legitimation of political-legal relations to three main types: traditional, charismatic and rational-legal. What features are characteristic of each of these types of legitimation of power?

Traditional legitimation of political and legal relations is based on custom, the norms of which act as the basis of domination and subordination. These customary norms indicate who has the right to rule and who is obliged to obey. With the traditional type of legitimation, the answer to the question of why power belongs to a given group of people is that it has always been this way. Such traditional norms are binding both in relation to members of the ruling group and in relation to the entire population. Violation of tradition by leaders leads to a loss of legitimacy of their power in the eyes of the masses and a change in the ruling group.

Charismatic legitimation of political-legal relations is based on the authority of the leader, to whom exceptional traits are attributed. The power of a charismatic leader is justified by the admiration of the majority of the population, which perceives him as their leader. In this case, intense emotional connections are established between the leader and the masses, and the words and deeds of such a leader are surrounded by an aura of infallibility.

In his political activities, he, as a rule, begins to be guided not by existing customs or current legal norms, but by his own inspiration. However, the failures of a charismatic leader can lead to his loss of popularity among the masses and, consequently, to his loss of legitimacy of his power. In addition, with charismatic power, the problem of its inheritance is always acute.

Rational-legal legitimation, or the legal type of establishing political-legal relations, is based on the voluntary recognition of legal norms governing relations of management and subordination. The most developed form of this type of legitimacy is the constitutional state. The Constitution defines the basic norms that clearly regulate the procedure for the formation, functioning and change of ruling groups. At the same time, these norms remain open to change, but also according to established procedures.

Thus, in systems of this type, power is legitimized and justified by current legislation.

Principles of legitimation: sovereignty of the people and human character. The most important principles of legitimation are the sovereignty of the people and human rights.

The principle of popular sovereignty is expressed in the right of citizens to communicate with each other and with the ruling elite and participate in the development of common decisions that affect their own interests. The implementation of this principle ensures the civil (public) autonomy of the country's population from political power and the protection of their interests from the arbitrariness of the authorities. As for the principle of human rights, it finds its expression in classical human rights, providing citizens with life, freedom and their personal (moral) autonomy.

Together, these principles ensure the legitimate rule of laws both from the point of view of the individual as a citizen (the principle of popular sovereignty) and from the point of view of the individual as an individual (the principle of human rights).

As noted by L.S. Sanisteban, the current principles of legitimacy establish a necessary minimum of trust between the ruling elite and those outside it. Those who rule in such a case feel that they are doing so legally, and those who obey consider their claim to be legitimate. Thus, recognition of the legitimacy of power, and in a broad sense of political-legal relations, is extremely important for its effectiveness.